South East Asia’s competing political models
As I write this article — while sitting in a cafe in downtown Saigon — a few streets away a group of protesters have just been re-sentenced to prison for advocating publicly for freedom of speech. Rather strangely this is something their country’s own constitution includes among its citizen’s rights, but of course these rights only really apply under certain conditions.
At the same time, over 1000 kilometres to the north, the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) is ending their annual congress in Hanoi. Giant LED screens attached to office buildings are showing the overweight, balding party leader solemnly explaining the great job that the party has done containing the coronavirus in Vietnam.
The same leader was just re-appointed to a third term in office, breaking a rule that forced presidents to only serve two terms. The third was handily just created due to the special circumstances around the virus.
When it comes to Covid-19, The Vietnamese government indeed deserves no small amount of credit. By hacking into the Chinese government’s servers in January, the leadership was able to get an understanding of the severity of the situation and closed their borders early. Since then they’ve pursued an aggressive policy of forcibly detaining anyone who even comes near an infected case. With one of the lowest casualty numbers in the world and no lock-downs, it’s difficult to argue with results.
There is a general consensus that the Covid era has been devastating for democracy, and good for authoritarianism. Vietnam in many ways confirms this view, and out of all the countries in the world — apart from Singapore — Vietnam probably comes closest to the political system described as “soft authoritarianism.” A term coined by political scientists in the early 90s to describe states that could limit their dictatorial power just enough to keep their citizens in check.
The Vietnamese government, like others in the region, maintains power with a simple philosophy: “We grow the economy and you can do what you like, just as long as you don't question our rule.”
This winning formula was once used by another country just north of the border. China’s system in the 90s appeared very similar to Vietnam’s today, a place to make money and not get involved in politics. But throughout the 2010s China morphed into a place where ordinary people were expected to become more and not less political, and where the party played an ever increasing role in daily life.
Vietnam may have a legal system and bureaucracy every bit as authoritarian as China's, but there is no social credit system, no great firewall, no mass incarceration of minorities, and no threatening to invade neighbouring countries. All of the things that China has become so admired for.
The great question for Vietnam is whether the country will go the same way as their northern neighbour. Are they in the early stages of sweeping authoritarian reform or will the VCP choose a different path from the CCP?
Despite the crackdowns across the region that have accompanied the Covid era, there are many indicators that signal a countervailing trend.
Thailand, out of all the South East Asian countries, stands out as being the most Western friendly, and despite being a military dictatorship, remained one of the least abusive regimes in the region. Much of this changed with the mass protests that broke out last summer which saw tens of thousands calling for fair elections, something the country in fact had before its 13th military coup in 2014.
I experienced this general dissatisfaction first hand a few years ago when bombs were set off near the hotel I was staying at in Bangkok. Thankfully no one was killed, but this was a prelude to the popular discontent that escalated in 2020. While the protests have since died down, they only halted because of a new outbreak, and seem primed to continue in the future.
Another example that reformers in the region can look to is a country with a much longer history of democratic institutions. Malaysia’s recent affairs offer an insight into the political power struggle shaping the region.
In 2015 it emerged that the Prime Minister of Malaysia, Rajib Nazak, had been receiving billions in laundered money through a fund called 1MDB (1 Malaysia Development Burhad), that appeared to have been solicited mainly by Chinese conglomerates. The news caused such an outcry in Malaysian parliament that Nazak was forced to resign and sentenced to 12 years in prison. Resulting in an opposition party coming into power for the first time in the country’s modern history.
“We Malaysians have to learn not to always look to other countries for help.” I was told by a lawyer friend in the country when the scandal first broke. “We need to start doing things for ourselves.”
Rather amazingly then, by trying to bribe the Malaysian government, the CCP managed to mistakenly turn the country into the only fully fledged democracy on the mainland.
The CCP of course seemed confused by this whole affair. Seemingly not understanding why other countries didn't simply jail inconvenient reporters like they did.
Indonesia, which allowed free elections in the 1990s, has proven a surprisingly resilient success story ever since, and remains the largest Islamic democracy on the globe.
Even technocratic Singapore, once looked to by the Chinese as a model for their own governance, introduced limited elections in 2011, albeit with very strict requirements. Which makes the story of a global authoritarian resurgence rather premature.
South East Asia actually seems to represent a group of countries with political models in competition with each other. Strongly influenced by the larger powers that they have to contend with.
On the other side of the spectrum from Malaysia is Cambodia, a country which is little more than a Chinese puppet state. Hun Sen, the current head of state, owes his position to CCP support for his 1997 military coup and was the first leader to visit the country during the pandemic. He appeared beside Xi Jinping back in January, sycophantically praising his leadership and urging Cambodians not to wear masks, saying: “The prime minister doesn’t wear a mask, so why do you?”
All of this behaviour forms the frontier of what others have called a second Cold War waging between the US, China, and to a lesser extent, India. Thankfully the parties involved in the conflict so far prefer economics to napalm. But in the last few years the great power rivalries have started to manifest themselves more directly.
At least 23 soldiers have been killed along the Sino-Indian border since last year, after a road building contest led to a military standoff in the Himalayas. As of last month the Chinese military has completely withdrawn and India even regained all territory that it lost in 1962. Suggesting that the PLA is perhaps not the world class organisation that some have been led to believe.
But with its apparent support for the recent military coup in Myanmar, the CCP is now propping up at least three military dictatorships. And continues to threaten Taiwan with warships and fighter jets.
With the new Biden administration, the Cold War between China and the US is effectively in a stalemate. Where both sides talk nice in public but behind the scenes work to undermine each other. While surface-level phenomena like the trade war and overt alliances are called off, the administration is so far continuing most of the projects that the Trump team set in motion. Which will likely be the new normal no matter how much American firms like Chinese money.
What comes from this power struggle will decide the fate of much of the developing world. The different systems are not just abstract ideas, they will decide whether people live lives where they can speak and act without fear of torture and imprisonment. Whether they choose their livelihoods or have them chosen for them.
Despite what looks to be a growing authoritarian resurgence in the world, especially during the Covid era, the opposite trend towards democratisation should not be ignored.
The younger generations in almost all developing countries are less prone to nationalism, more humanistic, and more open to ideas of human rights. The opportunities and exposure to ideas that modern technology brings creates a desire for humanistic values. The same values that inspire global protests from Thailand to Bolivia.
The same process can be viewed even in Vietnam, where people have mostly free internet access. Survey data finds that the youth repeatedly express support for human rights and greater freedom. While the government uses its power to curtail them, it is unable to turn the clocks back to a time without such impulses. So even while authoritarian systems advance, the overall trend points in the opposite direction.
Vietnam may well become more dictatorial during the next few years. But I very much doubt it will follow the same path as China in reviving the old Stalinist machinery. The country shares the same Confucian traditions of work ethic and bureaucracy with their old ruler. But Vietnam never developed into a fully totalitarian state, and likely never will.
Yu Maochun, chief advisor to the outgoing secretary of state Mike Pompeo, wrote about how democratisation in South East Asia could be achieved within his lifetime.
He believed that just as the NATO alliance in Western Europe against the USSR had put pressure on countries like Spain and Portugal to democratise. Yu thought that the same thing could happen in South East Asia with a military alliance faced against China.
He encouraged the expansion of the currently existing alliance in the south pacific, the Quad, (now including Japan, Australia, India, the US, Vietnam, South Korea, and New Zealand) towards this end.
If such an alliance is able to succeed, it must be based on pragmatism first. And preventing the growth of an expansionist Chinese superpower is in almost everyone's common interest. Vietnam is by no means tolerant of human rights, but its 246 political prisoners pales in comparison to the millions incarcerated north of the border.
So too with the other regimes. Cambodia and Myanmar (and possibly Laos) are likely lost causes, all falling inside the Chinese sphere of influence. But in general the democracies of the world must seek alliances where they can be found, and not hesitate to lend their support, while making it clear that they stand for human rights.
It is in this instance, a case of choosing the lesser evil to stop greater harm. And if Yu Maochun is right, such an alliance may strengthen the humanitarian causes inside these countries.
In other words, it's a case of working with the softer authoritarians, to stop the harder kind.
While the anti-democratic surge is real, and looks especially dire during these years of lockdowns. We should not forget that the countervailing trend is, in most ways, far stronger.